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    The Investment Committee Memo Is Written After the Decision, and That Is Why It Misleads

    Robert OdhiamboFounder, FundverseNovember 9, 202611 min read
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    By the time an investment committee memo is drafted, the deal champion has usually decided. Why that turns analysis into advocacy, and how funds can redesign the memo and the room to fix it.

    Picture a partner who has spent six weeks on a deal. She sourced it herself, met the management team four times, sat through two rounds of diligence calls and told the counterparty, in the friendly way these things get said, that the fund is very interested. On a Thursday evening she opens a blank document and starts the investment committee memo. Ask her what it is for and she will say it is a rigorous analysis of whether the fund should invest. Watch her write it and you will see something closer to a closing argument.
    None of this requires bad faith. It is simply the order of events. In most funds conviction forms first and the memo follows, and a document written to record a conclusion behaves differently from one written to reach it. It selects evidence, arranges it persuasively, softens the awkward parts and hands the committee a story that is easy to approve. I will argue that this is the central weakness of the standard memo, that committees mostly respond by judging the story rather than the decision, and that funds can fix much of it by changing what the memo contains and how the room works.

    Conviction arrives before the document

    Deals rarely arrive as neutral questions. They arrive attached to a person who found them, believes in them and has already spent political capital on them. By the time the formal memo exists, the champion has formed a view in the first meetings, tested it informally with a partner or two, signaled enthusiasm to the other side and done a great deal of work, which matters more than people admit.
    Three pressures sit around that person. The first is credit. In many firms the partner who brings in a deal that closes is recognized for it, in compensation discussions, in internal standing and in the story the firm tells about itself, while a deal that dies in committee earns nothing. Her sincere intentions may be impeccable, but her interests lean toward approval, and interests shape which risks look fatal and which look manageable.
    The second is sunk effort. Diligence costs hours, advisor fees and goodwill spent with the counterparty, and every week invested makes walking away feel like waste, even though money already spent has no bearing on whether the next dollar should go in. The third is the relationship. A founder or sponsor who has been open and likable for six weeks becomes someone the champion does not want to disappoint, and often someone she will work with for years if the deal closes. Warmth is useful information about a counterparty, but it is also pressure that points in one direction. Together, these forces mean the memo is drafted by the person least inclined to put the strongest case against the deal on paper.

    What the committee actually sees

    Committee members do not see the diligence. They see a document, usually delivered a day or two before the meeting, often read between other commitments, and almost always opening with a recommendation. That order is convenient and quietly powerful, because a recommendation on page one gives every later fact a frame. Strong unit economics read as confirmation. A concentrated customer base reads as a risk the team has already thought about, since the memo mentions a mitigation. The reader stops forming a view and starts checking whether the stated view survives.
    The anchor also comes from a colleague the reader respects and will sit across from afterward, so disagreeing with a polished recommendation has a social price. It implies the champion missed something, or that you read more carefully than she worked. In many committees the practical result is that questions cluster around the edges, such as the valuation multiple, a covenant or a clause, while the central bet goes unexamined.
    House style adds to this, because house styles reward fluency: a well-written market section, a clean financial summary, a tidy risk table. A committee that has read hundreds of these learns to treat quality of presentation as a proxy for quality of thinking. The proxy is not worthless, since sloppy memos do tend to hide sloppy work. The reverse does not hold. A beautifully argued memo can be wrong exactly where the argument was most elegant, and a committee that evaluates elegance is evaluating the author, not the decision.
    The risk table deserves its own suspicion. Nearly every memo has one, and nearly every risk in it comes with a mitigation. The format implies that risks are problems with solutions, when many are simply things that might go wrong, with some probability, at a cost the fund will bear. A table that pairs each risk with a reassurance teaches the committee to feel safe rather than to price the exposure.

    Redesign the memo, not the people

    The tempting response is to tell champions to be more objective. That fails for the same reason telling people to be less biased fails: the pressures are structural, and the person inside them cannot see them well. A better response changes the document and the process so the useful information reaches the page whatever the champion feels. A few changes do most of the work, and they carry across asset classes with some adjustment.

    Write down the assumptions the deal needs

    Every investment is a bundle of assumptions. A growth buyout might depend on the sponsor taking cost out without damaging service, on a stable end market and on a refinancing window that stays open. A venture deal might depend on a distribution channel holding its price and on a founder hiring a certain kind of executive within a year. A private credit loan might depend on one customer renewing, on collateral being realizable and on the borrower's reporting being accurate. The memo should list the handful of assumptions without which the deal fails, usually three to six, and say plainly what evidence supports each.
    The harder step is to state, for each, what observation would show it to be false. Call these kill criteria or tripwires. A belief with no stated way of being wrong is an attachment, not an assumption. Take a hypothetical lender sizing a facility against a borrower whose largest customer supplies 40% of revenue: the memo might say that if that contract is not renewed on broadly similar terms, the credit no longer works at this size. A venture investor might write that if net revenue retention in the next two cohorts falls below a level she names, the growth thesis is in doubt. The numbers belong in the memo, set by the team, because the exercise is about committing before the facts arrive.

    Imagine the failure first

    A pre-mortem asks the deal team to assume that, three years out, the investment has gone badly, and to write the most plausible account of why. It works because it changes the social rules. In an ordinary discussion, raising a weakness looks like opposing the deal; in a pre-mortem, raising a weakness is the assignment. People who held back concerns during diligence often produce sharp, specific ones when the task is to explain a hypothetical failure. The best use of the result is to compare the failure stories against the assumptions list. If a plausible failure is not covered by any listed assumption, the list is incomplete.

    Give disagreement a job

    A named devil's advocate turns dissent from a personal act into a role. One member, rotated across deals so it does not become a reputation, reads the memo adversarially and argues the case against. The assignment should come early enough that the advocate can ask the deal team for data instead of merely offering opinions in the room. Done badly, this is theater: a token objection, politely dismissed. Done well, the advocate's note is attached to the memo and the committee must answer it explicitly, which makes dismissing it a recorded choice rather than a mood.

    Start from the outside view

    Champions argue from the inside, from what is special about this company, sponsor or borrower. The outside view asks how deals of this type usually turn out. A private equity team can look at how comparable buyouts in the same sector and size band performed against their original plans. A credit fund can look at default and recovery patterns for similar structures and borrowers. A venture investor can ask how often companies at this stage with this kind of traction raise a next round at all. Base rates should come from the fund's own history where it has one, and otherwise from the best available industry data, with its limits stated. The memo then has to explain why this deal should beat the reference class, which is a fair thing to argue and a much harder thing to assert casually.
    Two process changes support all of this. Where practical, circulate the analysis before the recommendation, or at least separate them, so members form an initial view of the evidence before meeting the champion's conclusion. And let members record preliminary assessments privately before discussion starts, since the first person to speak often sets the range of what everyone else is willing to say.

    The memo as a record you can audit

    A memo written this way does a second job that may matter more over time: it records what the fund believed when it committed. Most funds do not have that. They have a memo telling the story the champion wanted told, plus a vague institutional recollection that has been quietly edited by what happened afterward.
    Hindsight is a powerful editor. When an investment works, people remember believing in it for the right reasons; when it fails, they remember the warning signs. Neither memory is reliable, and a fund cannot learn from a decision whose reasoning it can no longer reconstruct. With assumptions, kill criteria, base rates and the advocate's objections on file, a later review can ask real questions. Did the assumption that failed look weak at the time? Was the base rate ignored or outweighed? Did the committee override a tripwire, and why? That is how a fund separates a good decision with a bad outcome from a bad decision that got lucky, a distinction that matters enormously and is nearly impossible to draw without a record.
    The same record changes portfolio monitoring. Instead of general check-ins asking how the company is doing, the team can track the specific assumptions the deal depends on and watch for the tripwires it named. A deteriorating indicator triggers a conversation agreed in advance, not a debate about whether the numbers are really that bad, and monitoring depends less on the champion's mood, which after closing tends to defend the original decision for all the reasons described earlier.
    It also improves reporting to LPs, or to whoever stands behind the capital, whether a board, a donor, a depositor base or a family. They reasonably want to know how a fund's judgment performs, not only how its returns look. A fund with contemporaneous records can describe what it expected, where it was wrong and what it changed. A fund without them can only offer narrative.

    The case for speed and conviction

    There is a serious objection. Competitive deals move fast. A founder with three term sheets will not wait for a pre-mortem, and a sponsor running an auction sets a timetable that does not care about your process. Good investing often depends on conviction held against consensus, and committees have a poor record of backing ideas that look strange at first. A fund that adds ceremony to every decision may find its rigor consists mostly of losing the best deals to firms that are quicker or braver.
    I think this is partly right, and it is a reason to be careful about what gets added, not a reason to skip the work. Conviction is not the enemy; unexamined conviction is. A champion who is certain and has written down what would prove her wrong can move faster than one who has not, because the committee can trust the first more quickly. The assumptions list and kill criteria are also cheap next to the rest of diligence. They take hours, not weeks, and those hours force clarity about what the deal depends on.
    Proportionality is the practical answer. A small early check in a venture round does not need a base-rate study; it needs half a page naming the two or three things that must be true and what would show they are not. A large buyout or sizable credit facility, where the downside is large and the timetable usually allows it, warrants the full pre-mortem, a formal advocate and a proper reference-class analysis. Reversible decisions, such as small tickets, follow-on options or staged commitments, can take a lighter process. Scale rigor to the cost of being wrong and the difficulty of reversing, not to the excitement of the moment. In the fastest process, the piece worth keeping is the written list of tripwires, because it costs almost nothing and pays off at monitoring time.
    If you want diligence materials and the reasoning behind a decision kept together where you can revisit them, take a look at Fundverse for investors.

    What a better memo is for

    The conventional memo answers the wrong question. It asks, in effect, whether the case for the deal is persuasive, and a skilled champion can almost always make it so. The question a committee needs answered is what has to be true for this to work, how likely that is, and what the fund will do if it turns out to be false. A memo built around that question will sometimes be less pleasant to read. It will leave doubts visible, and some champions will dislike seeing their favorite deals described with their weaknesses attached.
    But a fund is not a collection of persuasive stories. It is a repeated bet on its own judgment, and judgment improves only when it can be examined. Funds that treat the memo as a record of reasoning rather than an instrument of approval give themselves the chance to learn they are wrong early enough to act, and to learn something even when they are right. That is worth more than any amount of polish on page one.
    If you want to test this at your own fund, start small: at your next committee meeting, add half a page listing the assumptions the deal needs and what would show each one false, then look back at it when the first quarterly update arrives. Watch whether the conversation at that update changes, and whether the committee, given the chance, would have asked different questions at the vote.

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    Topics

    investment committee memo
    investment committee process
    pre-mortem
    deal champion bias
    kill criteria
    base rates
    portfolio monitoring
    private equity due diligence

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